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Abstract 
 
Different solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set, ...) can be defined using 
either a direct or an indirect dominance relation. Direct dominance implies indirect 
dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic 
(direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize 
absolutely stable roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the 
conditions on preference profiles such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in 
roommate problems. Furthermore, we characterize absolutely stable roommate problems 
having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of an absolutely stable roommate 
problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching in which all agents who mutually top 
rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched. 
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1 Introduction
In many social situations, agents may team up in pairs or remain on their own.
Gale and Shapley (1962) coined such situations as roommate problems. Roommate
problems are a generalization of the well-known marriage problem, for which Gale
and Shapley (1962) showed that there always exists a stable matching: all agents are
matched to an acceptable partner and no two agents prefer being matched to one
another over being matched to their current partner. It is well known that the set
of stable matchings is equivalent to the core of a matching problem. Even though
the concept of the core has attractive properties and has been widely used in the
literature, it has some important drawbacks and limitations. First and foremost,
unlike in the marriage problem, the core may not exist in roommate problems.
Second, the core may not satisfy external stability: a matching can be outside the
core and not be blocked by a stable matching. This has been pointed out by Ehlers
(2007) in the case of the marriage problem. Third, when deviating, the core relies
on a direct dominance concept: one matching directly dominates another if some
coalition of agents can nd and enforce another matching which is preferred by
all members of that coalition. Agents do not consider that their action may trigger
other deviations, that is, the deviation is myopic. In order to take further deviations
into account, Harsanyi (1974) introduced the notion of indirect dominance, which
was later formalized by Chwe (1994). In a roommate problem,1 an end matching
indirectly dominates an initial matching if the end matching can replace the initial
matching through a sequence of matchings, such that, at each matching along the
sequence, all deviators are strictly better o¤ at the end matching compared to the
status-quo they face. Indirect dominance thus captures the idea that farsighted
agents consider the end matching that their matching(s) may lead to. It is immediate
that direct dominance implies indirect dominance but not vice versa.
These drawbacks have led to the literature to expand in two directions by in-
troducing alternative solution concepts and by introducing farsightedness through
indirect dominance. The various solution or stability concepts (core, stable sets,
largest consistent set, ...) can be dened using either a direct or an indirect domi-
nance relation. The main lesson to be drawn from the literature is that this choice
very often yields striking di¤erences in terms of which matchings are expected to be
1More generally, farsightedness has been introduced in the study of hedonic games, to which
roommate problems belong (Diamantoudi and Xue, 2003).
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stable. Regarding the marriage problem, Ehlers (2007) characterized von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets using the direct dominance relation, if such sets exist. He
showed that these can be larger than the core. Mauleon et al (2011), using Chwes
(1994) denition of indirect dominance, showed the existence of and completely char-
acterized the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton
and belongs to the core. They also showed that the farsighted core, dened as the set
of matchings that are not indirectly dominated by other matchings, can be empty.
The farsighted core only exists when the core contains a unique matching and no
other matching indirectly dominates the matching in the core. Klaus et al. (2011)
investigated von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in the roommate
problem. They showed that von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets do
not always exist and, when there exist, they can contain more than one element.
A natural question to ask is if we can characterize the domain of preferences
of the agents such that indirect dominance implies direct dominance in a matching
problem.2 Harsanyi (1974), in a cooperative game theory setting and using some-
what di¤erent dominance denitions,3 was the rst to introduce this idea. He dened
the relation x indirectly dominates yto be trivial if at the same time x directly
dominates yand dened a game to be absolutely stable if every possible indirect
dominance relation is also trivial. Weber (1976), using the Harsanyis dominance
denitions, provided a full characterization of absolutely stable games for the class
of normalized monotonic games.
To the best of our knowledge, no characterization of absolute stability is available
for other settings. In this paper we fully characterize the absolutely stable roommate
problems when agents have strict preferences. Our main result (Proposition 2) is
that a roommate problem is absolutely stable if and only if two conditions are
satised. When two agents prefer to be matched to one another than being on their
2In a similar vein, but in the context of social choice, Barberá et al. (2010) studied restrictions
of preferences such that individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent concepts.
3Harsanyi (1974) introduced two di¤erent notions of indirect dominance. The rst is based
on the idea of a monotone chain: x indirectly dominates y if there exists a monotone chain
connecting x and y. This means that along the sequence connecting x and y, deviating agents do
not only prefer x to the status quo but in addition their deviation must also be preferred to the
status quo. The second denition is the one we have introduced above and formalized by Chwe
(1994): matchings along the sequence are not required to directly dominate each other.
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own, we say that these two agents are mutually acceptable. The rst condition then
states that mutually acceptable agents must prefer each other to agents that are
acceptable to them but not vice versa. Now take any agent i and let us rank the
set of his mutually acceptable agents according to agent i0s preferences. The second
condition states that if any agent k of this set, di¤erent from the lowest ranked
one, has a mutually acceptable agent l he prefers to agent i, then agent l must be
i0s lowest ranked mutually acceptable agent and agent k must be i0s second worst
mutually acceptable agent. Suppose for instance that agents i and k are matched.
This condition implies that anytime agent k looks for and nds a better partner,
then either i can nd a better partner than k or she prefers to be on her own. We
subsequently give some features of agentspreferences in a roommate problem which
is absolutely stable (Proposition 3) and we show (Proposition 4) that a roommate
problem with three agents who prefer being matched to being unmatched is always
absolutely stable. Such a roommate problem may have an empty core from which we
conclude that the notion of absolute stability has little in common with well known
restrictions on preferences guaranteeing existence and/or uniqueness of the core in
the roommate problem such as -reducibility (Alcalde, 1995) or more generally, the
weak top coalition property (Banerjee et al., 2001).
Next, we focus on and characterize solvable absolutely stable roommate prob-
lems. We show in Proposition 5 that an absolutely stable roommate problem is
solvable when there does not exist a structure in the preference prole called ring,
formed by three agents such that the members of this ring prefer the other agents
in the ring to any other agent outside the ring. This allows us to state (Proposition
6) that, if it exists, the core of an absolutely stable roommate problem contains a
unique matching in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched
to each other and all other agents are single.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces roommate
problems. Section 3 denes absolute stability and contains our main results. Section
4 concludes.
2 Roommate problems
A roommate problem, is a pair (N;P ) where N is a nite set of agents and P is a
preference prole specifying for each agent i 2 N a strict preference ordering over
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N . That is, P = fP (1); :::; P (i); :::; P (n)g, where P (i) is agent is strict preference
ordering over the agents in N , including herself which can be interpreted as the
prospect of being alone. For instance, P (i) = 1; 3; i; 2; ::: indicates that agent i
prefers agent 1 to agent 3 and she prefers to remain alone rather than to get matched
to anyone else. We denote by R the weak orders associated with P . We write j i k
if agent i strictly prefers j to k, j vi k if i is indi¤erent between j and k, and j <i k
if j i k or j vi k.
A matching  is a function  : N ! N such that for all i 2 N , if (i) = j, then
(j) = i. Agent (i) is agent is mate at ; i.e., the agent with whom she is matched
to share a room (possibly herself). We denote by M the set of all matchings. A
matching  is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to his or her partner,
i.e. (i) <i i for all i 2 N . We denote the set of individually rational matchings
for a roommate problem (N;P ) by I(N;P ). For a given matching , a pair fi; jg
(possibly i = j) is said to form a blocking pair if they are not matched to one another
but prefer one another to their partner at , i.e. j i (i) and i j (j). A matching
 is stable if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair of agents. We denote the
set of stable matchings for a roommate problem (N;P ) by S(N;P ). A roommate
problem (N;P ) is solvable if S(N;P ) 6= ?. Otherwise, it is called unsolvable.
We extend each agents preference over her potential partners to the set of match-
ings in the following way. We say that agent i prefers 0 to , if and only if agent
i prefers her partner at 0 to her partner at , 0(i) i (i). Abusing notation, we
write this as 0 i . A coalition S is a subset of the set of agents N .4 For S  N ,
(S) = f(i) : i 2 Sg denotes the set of mates of agents in S at . A matching 
is blocked by a coalition S  N if there exists a matching 0 such that 0(S) = S
and for all i 2 S, 0 i . If S blocks , then S is called a blocking coalition for
. Note that if a coalition S  N blocks a matching , then there exists a pair
fi; jg (possibly i = j) that blocks . The core of a roommate problem consists of
all matchings which are not blocked by any coalition. Note that for any roommate
problem the set of stable matchings equals the core.
Denition 1. Given a matching , a coalition S  N is said to be able to enforce
a matching 0 over  if the following conditions hold: (i) 0(i) =2 f(i); ig implies
fi; 0(i)g  S and (ii) 0(i) = i 6= (i) implies fi; (i)g \ S 6= ?.
4Throughout the paper we use the notation  for weak inclusion and  for strict inclusion.
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In other words, this enforceability condition5 implies both that any new pair in
0 that does not exist in  should be between players in S, and that in order to
destroy an existing pair in , one of the two players involved in that pair should
belong to coalition S.6 Notice that the concept of enforceability is independent of
preferences. Furthermore, the fact that coalition S  N can enforce a matching 0
over  implies that there exists a sequence of matchings 0; 1; :::; K (where 0 = 
and K = 0) and a sequence of disjoint pairs fi0; j0g; :::; fiK 1; jK 1g (possibly
for some k 2 f0; 1; :::; K   1g, ik = jk) such that for any k 2 f1; :::; Kg, the pair
fik 1; jk 1g 2 S can enforce the matching k over k 1.
Denition 2. A matching  is directly dominated by 0, or 0 > , if there exists
a coalition S  N of agents such that 0 i  8i 2 S and S can enforce 0 over .
The direct dominance relation is denoted by >. An alternative way of dening
the core of a roommate problem is by means of the domination relation. A matching
 is in the core if there is no subset of agents who, by rearranging their partnerships
only among themselves, possibly dissolving some partnerships of , can all obtain
a strictly preferred set of partners. Formally, a matching  is in the core if  is
not directly dominated by any other matching 0 2 M. Given a prole P , we
denote the set of matchings in the core by C(>). Even though the core may be
empty in roommate problems, as Gale and Shapley (1962) showed, several papers
are devoted to analyze the core as solution for this matching problem. See for
instance Tan (1991), Chung (2000), Diamantoudi et al. (2004) and Iñarra et al.
(2010).
We now introduce the indirect dominance relation. A matching 0 indirectly
dominates  if 0 can replace  in a sequence of matchings, such that at each
matching along the sequence all deviators are strictly better o¤ at the end matching
0 compared to the status-quo they face. Formally, indirect dominance is dened as
follows.
5This enforceability condition has also been used in Mauleon et al. (2011) and in Klaus et al.
(2011).
6Notice that this enforceability condition is similar to the enforceability condition dened in
Roth and Sotomayor (1990). That is, a coalition S can enforce the set of pairs in the matching
0 that concerns its members if and only if every agent in S is matched to an agent in S and vice
versa.
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Denition 3. A matching  is indirectly dominated by 0, or  0, if there exists
a sequence of matchings 0; 1; :::; K (where 0 =  and K = 0) and a sequence
of coalitions S0; S1; :::; SK 1 such that for any k 2 f1; :::; Kg,
(i) K i k 1 8i 2 Sk 1, and
(ii) coalition Sk 1 can enforce the matching k over k 1.
The indirect dominance relation is denoted by . It is clear that direct domi-
nance implies indirect dominance, if  < 0 then   0 , since direct dominance
can be obtained by setting K = 1 in Denition 3. Recently, Mauleon et al. (2011)
have shown that, in marriage problems (a particular case of the roommate problem
where agents are partitioned in two sets), an individually rational matching  indi-
rectly dominates 0 if and only if there does not exist a pair fi; 0(i)g that blocks .
Klaus et al. (2011) have generalized this result for roommate problems, and they
have shown that an individually rational matching  indirectly dominates another
individually rational matching 0 if and only if there does not exist a pair fi; 0(i)g
that blocks . We refer to these papers for a proof.
Proposition 1 (Klaus et al., 2011). Let (N;P ) be a roommate problem and ; 0 2
I(N;P ). Then,  0 if and only if there does not exist a pair fi; 0(i)g that blocks
.
Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), showed that if a matching belongs to the core,
then it indirectly dominates any other matching.
Lemma 1 (Diamantoudi and Xue, 2003). If  2 C(>), then 80 6= , it holds that
0  .
3 Absolutely Stable Roommate Problems
Following Harsanyi (1974)s denition of absolutely stable games, we dene a room-
mate problem to be absolutely stable if and only if indirect dominance implies direct
dominance.
Denition 4. A roommate problem (N;P ) is absolutely stable if the following
condition holds:
0  , 0 > , 8; 0 2M.
6
Let (N;P ) be a roommate problem. Let i 2 N . We denote by t(i) the most
preferred partner for agent i. That is, t(i) <i j for any j 2 N . Let T denote the set
of agents who are ranked as top choice by their top choice; i.e.,
T = fi 2 N : 9j 2 N such that j = t(i) and i = t(j)g .
Notice that if i 2 T , then t(t(i)) = i.
Given the roommate problem (N;P ), the set M i denotes the set of mutually
acceptable agents for i, that is M i = fj 2 N : j i i and i j jg. Let !(i) 2 M i
denote the least preferred partner for i in this set; i.e., 8k 2M i : k <i !(i). LetM i;k
denote the set of mutually acceptable agents of i who are less preferred than k, that
is M i;k = fj 2 M i : k i jg. Let Ai denote the set of agents who are acceptable to
i, but not mutually acceptable; i.e., Ai = fj 2 N : j i i and j j ig.
We extend each agents preferences over potential partners to sets of agents in
the following way. We say that agent i prefers a set M i to a set Ai, if and only if
agent i prefers every agent in M i to any agent in Ai. Abusing notation, we write
this as M i i Ai.
The notion of a ring is a key notion for the existence of stable matchings in
roommate problems. A ring S = fs1; :::; skg  N is an ordered set of agents such
that k  3 and for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, si+1 si si 1 si si (subscript modulo k).
The existence of odd rings in the preference prole is a necessary condition for
the emptiness of the core in a roommate problem.
Lemma 2. Let (N;P ) be a roommate problem such that C(>) = ;. Then, there
exists a ring S = fs1; : : : ; skg, where k is odd.
This lemma is straightforward from the necessary and su¢ cient condition pro-
vided by Tan (1991) for the emptiness of the core in a roommate problem. We refer
the reader to Appendix A for a compilation of denitions and results about the
solvability of roommate problems.
Our main result characterizes the absolutely stable roommate problems.
Proposition 2. A roommate problem (N;P ) is absolutely stable if and only if the
preference relation P satises the following two conditions:
(i) 8i 2 N , M i i Ai,
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(ii) 8i 2 N , if 9 k 2M i n f!(i)g and 9 l 2Mk such that l k i then M i;k = flg.7
The proof of this proposition, as well as all other proofs, may be found in Ap-
pendix B. The rst condition can be interpreted as reciprocity, in the sense that
agent i prefers the agents that are mutually acceptable for her to the agents that do
not accept her although she accepts. The second condition says that if two agents
i; k are mutually acceptable but k prefers another mutually acceptable agent l more
than i, then, there cannot be any agent mutually acceptable for i less preferred than
k, di¤erent from l. In other words, l is the least preferred potential partner for i
among the mutually acceptable, and there are no agents in agent is preferences less
preferred than k but more preferred than l.
Example 1. The following example shows a roommate problem which is absolutely
stable.
P (1) P (2) P (3) P (4) P (5) P (6) P (7) P (8)
2 1 1 5 4 7 8 6
3 3 5 1 1 8 6 7
4 5 3 3 5 6 7 8
5 2 4
1
In this problem, the set of mutually acceptable agents are M1 = f2; 3; 4; 5g,
M2 = M3 = f1g, M4 = f5; 1g and M5 = f4; 1g, M6 = f7; 8g, M7 = f6; 8g and
M8 = f6; 7g. Notice that rst condition is satised since these agents are in the rst
rows of each agents preferences. Consider for instance agent 1s preferences, P (1).
Notice that agents 1 and 4 are mutually acceptable and 4 is not the worse agent in
M1, however, 5 4 1. Then, by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, agent 5 must be the
immediate less preferred agent than 4 for agent 1. Notice that {6,7,8} form an odd
ring in the preferences.
The next proposition describes some characteristics of agents preferences in
a roommate problem which is absolutely stable. These features depend on the
cardinality of the sets of mutually acceptable agents in the problem.
Proposition 3. Let (N;P ) be an absolutely stable roommate problem,
7Notice that l equals !(i).
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1. Let i be an agent such that jM ij > 2 and assume, without loss of generality,
that M i = fj1; : : : ; jk; !(i)g such that jm i jm+1, 8m 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g and
jk i !(i).
a. 8j 2M i n fjk; !(i)g, t(j) = i,
b. t(j) 2 fi; !(i)g
b.1 If t(jk) = i then either !(i) 2 T or t(!(i)) 2 fi; t(i)g, and
b.2 If t(jk) = !(i) then t(!(i)) = jk
2. Let i be an agent such that jM ij  2. Then either t(i) 2 T or i 2 S where
S is a ring in P such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si si 1 si j for any
j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
3. For all i =2 T , there is no agent j =2 T such that i 2 M j, except from those
belonging to a ring S in P such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si si 1 si j
for any j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
Notice that our previous example satises this characteristics.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). In this example, the only agent satisfying
jM ij  2 is agent 1 with M1 = f2; 3; 4; 5g and 2 1 3 1 4 1 5. We can see that
8j 2 f2; 3g, t(j) = 1 (condition (a)). Moreover, it must happen that t(4) 2 f1; 5g
(condition (b)). In this case, t(4) = 5 and therefore t(5) = 4 (condition (b.2)).
On the other hand, all the other agents satisfy jM ij  2. For i 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g,
we can check that t(i) 2 T . Agents in the set f6; 7; 8g form a ring satisfying that
8si 2 f6; 7; 8g, si+1 si si 1 si k for all k 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
Notice also that for i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, there is no pair of agents who do not belong
to T such that they are mutually acceptable. In our example, the only agent who
is not in T is agent 3, and there is no agent j in P (3) such that t(3) 3 j 3 3 and
j 2M3.
The following result shows that all roommate problems such that jN j = 3 in
which all players prefer to be matched to being unmatched are absolutely stable.
Proposition 4. Let (N;P ) be a roommate problem such that jN j = 3 and 8i 2 N :
j i i if j 6= i. Then (N;P ) is absolutely stable.
9
Note that this class of roommate problems can have an empty core when the three
players form an odd ring in P . This then implies that the notion of absolute stability
has little in common with restrictions on preferences which guarantee the existence
of stable matching and/or the uniqueness of stable matchings [e.g. -reducibility
(Alcalde, 1995) or more generally, the weak top coalition property (Banerjee et al.,
2001)].
The following proposition characterizes the absolutely stable roommate problems
with a non-empty core.
Proposition 5. Let (N;P ) be an absolutely stable roommate problem. C(>) 6= ; if
and only if there is no ring S in P such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si si 1 si j
for any j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
The following result, derived from the previous one, states that if a roommate
problem is absolutely stable and the core is nonempty, it has a unique stable match-
ing in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another
and all other agents remain unmatched.
Proposition 6. Let (N;P ) be an absolutely stable roommate problem with a non-
empty core. Then, C(<) = fCg, where C is such that C(i) = t(i) for all i 2 T ,
and C(j) = j for all j =2 T .
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). In this example, we have already seen that
there is a ring S = f6; 7; 8g in P such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si si 1 si j
for any j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g. Therefore this roommate problem is unsolvable and
there is no stable matching.
Consider the roommate problem derived from the previous one such that N =
f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and P = fP (1); P (2); P (3); P (4); P (5)g. In this case, there is no ring
in preferences satisfying the conditions above and therefore the problem is solvable.
The core, in this case, is formed by the matching  = ff1; 2g; f3g; f4; 5gg.
4 Conclusion
We have characterized absolutely stable roommate problems when preferences are
strict. That is, we have obtained under which conditions on preference proles
indirect dominance implies direct dominance in roommate problems. Furthermore,
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we have characterized absolutely stable roommate problems having a non-empty
core. This characterization has allowed us to state that if the core of an absolutely
stable roommate problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching in which all
agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other
agents remain unmatched.
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Appendix A
Tan (1991) establishes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the solvability of
roommate problems with strict preferences in terms of stable partitions. This notion,
which is crucial in the investigation of the core for these problems, can be formally
dened as follows.
Let A = fa1; :::; akg  N be an ordered set of agents. The set A is a ring if
k  3 and for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, ai+1 ai ai 1 ai ai (subscript modulo k). The set
A is a pair of mutually acceptable agents if k = 2 and for all i 2 f1; 2g, ai 1 ai ai
(subscript modulo 2).8 The set A is a singleton if k = 1.
Denition 5. A stable partition is a partition P of N such that:
(i) for all A 2 P , the set A is a ring, a mutually acceptable pair of agents or a
singleton, and
8Hereafter we omit subscript modulo k.
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(ii) for any sets A = fa1; :::; akg and B = fb1; :::; blg of P (possibly A = B), the
following condition holds:
if bj ai ai 1 then bj 1 bj ai,
for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and j 2 f1; :::; lg such that bj 6= ai+1:
Condition (i) species the sets contained in a stable partition, and condition (ii)
contains the notion of stability to be applied between these sets (and also inside
each set).
Note that a stable partition is a generalization of a stable matching. To see this,
consider a matching  and a partition P formed by pairs of agents and/or singletons.
Let A = fa1; a2 = (a1)g and B = fb1; b2 = (b1)g be sets of P . If P is a stable
partition then Condition (ii) implies that if b1 a2 a1 then b2 b1 a2, which is the
usual notion of stability. Hence  is a stable matching.
Proposition 7 (Inarra et al., 2010). (i) A roommate problem (N;P ) has no stable
matchings if and only if there exists a stable partition with an odd ring.9 (ii) Any
two stable partitions have exactly the same odd rings.(iii) Every even ring in a stable
partition can be broken into pairs of mutually acceptable agents preserving stability.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. ()) By contradiction, we will show that if one of the
conditions (i) or (ii) is not satised, then  0 ;  > 0.
 Suppose that condition (i) is not satised. Then there exists an agent i 2 N
such that k i j for some k 2 Ai and some j 2M i. Let 2 be a matching such
that 2(i) = k and 2(s) = s for every s 6= i; k, and let 1 be a matching such
that 1(i) = j and 1(s) = s for every s 6= i; j. Then 1  2 (since k k i,
agent k enforces the matching in which every agents is alone, and this matching
is blocked by fi; jg enforcing 1). However, 1  2 since 2(i) i 1(i).
 Suppose that condition (ii) is not satised. Then there exists an agent k 2
M i n f!(i)g and an agent l 2 Mk such that l k i and flg 6= M i;k. Then it
9A ring is odd (even) if its cardinality is odd (even).
12
must be the case that there exists some agent j 6= l such that j 2 M i;k. Let
2 be a matching such that 2(i) = k and 2(s) = s for every s 6= i; k, and
let 1 be a matching such that 1(k) = l, 1(i) = j and where 1(s) = s for
every s 6= i; k; l; j. Then 1  2 (since fk; lg block 2 enforcing a matching
in which i and j are alone, and this matching is blocked by fi; jg enforcing
1). However, 1  2 since 2(i) i 1(i).
(() Now we will prove that if 1  2 and conditions (i) and (ii) are satised,
then 1 > 2.
Given that 1  2, we dene the set of agents who have a di¤erent partner in both
matchings. Let D = fi 2 N : 1(i) 6= 2(i)g.
First, we prove that for any agent i 2 D such that 1(i) 6= i, 1(i) i 2(i).
By contradiction, let 1(i) = j and let 2(i) = k and assume that k i j (which
implies that k 6= j). Notice that j 2 M i because otherwise fi; jg will never be
formed contradicting 1  2. Since 1  2 and i prefers 2 to 1, we must have
that k prefers 1 to 2 because, otherwise, fi; kg would be a blocking pair of 1
contradicting that 1  2 [see Proposition 1 of Klaus et al. (2011)] . By condition
(i), we have that k 2 M i. Then, the new partner of k at 1, 1(k) = l (l 6= k; j),
and such that l k i, also belongs to the set of mutually acceptable agents of player
k, l 2 Mk. But then, according to (ii), it must be that M i;k = flg. But this is a
contradiction, since j 2M i;k. Hence, player i should also prefer 1(i) to 2(i).
Second, consider any agent i in D such that 1(i) = i and 2(i) = k. Since
1  2, then either 1(k) k i and k deviates leaving agent i unmatched (with
1(k) also preferring 1 to 2), or i i k and agent i individually deviates.
Let D0 = fi 2 D : 1(i) i 2(i)g. Then the coalition D0 deviates from 2
enforcing 1 (agents in D n D0 are singletons at 1) and 1 > 2 as we wanted to
prove.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will show the di¤erent parts of this proposition by
contradiction.
1. Assume that (a) is not satised. That is, there exists an agent j 2 M i n
fjk; !(i)g such that t(j) 6= i. This implies that 9k 2 N such that t(j) = k and
k j i. By condition (i) of Proposition 2, k 2M j and then by condition (ii) of
Proposition 2, M i;j = fkg. However, this contradicts that fjk; !(i)g M i;j.
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Now we will show that (b) must be satised as well. The fact that t(jk) 2
fi; !(i)g is straightforward from condition (ii) of Proposition 2.
In order to prove (b.1), let t(jk) = i. First, we will show that if !(i) =2 T then
either t(!(i)) = i or t(!(i)) = t(i). Let !(i) =2 T . Then, there exists and agent
k such that t(!(i)) = k and t(k) = l 6= !(i) so l k !(i) and by condition (i)
of Proposition 2, l 2 Mk. If k = i we are done, so assume that k 6= i. Since
k !(i) i and i 2 M!(i), by condition (i) of Proposition 2, k 2 M!(i). Thus,
9 k 2M!(i) n f!(!(i))g and 9 l 2Mk such that l k !(i). Then, by condition
(ii) of Proposition 2, it holds that flg =M!(i);k. Since k !(i) i and i 2M!(i),
we have that l = i. Given that l 2 Mk and l = i, it holds that k 2 M i. Let
k 6= t(i), otherwise we are done. Then since i 2Mk n f!(k)g and there exists
an agent k0 2 M i such that k0 i k (remember that k 6= t(i)), by condition
(ii) of Proposition 2, fk0g = Mk;i. But this implies that k0 = !(i) and this is
a contradiction since !(i) i k. So we have proved that when !(i) =2 T either
t(!(i)) = i or t(!(i)) = t(i).
Now we will show that if t(!(i)) =2 fi; t(i)g, then !(i) 2 T . Let t(!(i)) = k with
k 6= i; t(i). By condition (ii) of Proposition 2, either t(k) = !(i) and we are
done, or there exists an agent l 2 Mk such that l k !(i) and flg = M!(i);k,
which implies that l = i. Following the previous reasoning, we achieve the
same contradiction (!(i) i k) and this proves that !(i) 2 T as desired.
Next, we proceed to prove (b.2). Let t(jk) = !(i). We will prove that in this
case t(!(i)) = jk. Since i 2 M jk , we have that !(i) 2 M jk n f!(jk)g. By
condition (ii) of Proposition 2, either t(!(i)) = jk and we are done, or there
exists an agent k 2 M!(i) such that k !(i) jk and fkg = M jk;!(i). Then,
k = i, with i 2 M!(i) n f!(!(i))g. Hence, by condition (ii) of Proposition 2,
we have that for any j 2 M i n f!(i)g, j i !(i), then fjg = M!(i);i. But
jM i nf!(i)gj > 1, and then fjg =M!(i);i for all j 2M i nf!(i)g, contradicting
the uniqueness of M!(i);i.
2. Let i be an agent such that jM ij  2. We will prove that either t(i) 2 T or
agent i belongs to a ring S such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si si 1 si t
for any t 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
Consider rst that M i = fjg and assume that t(j) = k with k 6= i. By the
reasoning in [1.], if jM jj > 2, then t(k) = j and we are done. So let jM jj  2.
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Since k 2 M j n f!(j)g, by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, either t(k) = j or
there exists an agent l 2 Mk such that l k j and flg = M j;k. However, this
implies l = i (sinceM i = fjg and jM jj  2). And this is a contradiction since
i 2Mk but k =2M i. Hence, if M i = fjg, then either t(j) = i or t(j) = k with
t(k) = j.
Without loss of generality, let M i = fj; kg with j i k. Since j 2M i n f!(i)g
and by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, we deduce (following the same reasoning
as before) that t(j) 2 fi; kg. Let assume that t(j) = k, otherwise we are done.
We will show that then t(k) = j.
Assume that there exists an agent s 2 M j n fi; kg such that s j i. Since
j 2 M i n !(i), by condition (ii) of Proposition 2, fsg = M i;j, which implies
s = k. Therefore, there cannot be any agent s between k and i in agent js
preferences (with k j s j i).
Consider now the case such that there exists an agent s 2M j such that i j s.
Then jM jj > 2 and by the reasoning of [1.], t(j) = k implies t(k) = j.
Let M j = fk; ig with k j i. Then, k 2 M j n !(j) and by condition (ii)
of Proposition 2, either t(k) = j and we are done or there exists and agent
l 2 Mk such that l k j and flg = M j;k, which implies l = i. Given that
there cannot be any agent between i and j in agent ks preferences, we have
that S = fi; j; kg form a ring in P such that 8si 2 S, si+1 i si 1 i t for any
t 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g. Therefore if t(j) = k, then either t(k) = j or i 2 S where
S is a ring in preferences with jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 i si 1 i t for any
t 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
3. Now, we will prove, by contradiction, that there is no pair of agents not belong-
ing to T who are mutually acceptable among themselves, except from those
belonging to an odd ring S such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 i si 1 i t for
any t 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g. Assume that there are two agents i; j =2 T such that
i 2 M j and they do not belong to a ring with the features mentioned above.
First, notice that jM ij  2, otherwise by [1.], i 2 T and this is a contradiction.
We know by [2.] that t(i) 2 T , which implies that t(i) 6= j, since j =2 T . Let
t(i) = k (with k 6= j). Since k i j, by condition (i) of Proposition 2, we have
that k 2M i nf!(i)g. Since i =2 T , it follows that t(k) 6= i, and there is at least
15
one agent, l, with l = t(k). By condition (i) of Proposition 2, l 2Mk n f!(k)g
with l k i. By condition (ii) of Proposition 2, flg = M i;k, which implies
l = j and therefore t(k) = j. However, this contradicts j =2 T given that, as
mentioned above, t(i) = k with k 2 T .
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that 8i 2 N , j i i if j 6= i but (N;P ) is not
absolutely stable.. Then there exist 1 and 2 such that 1  2 but 1  2. First
note that neither 1 nor 2 can be the matching in which every agent is a singleton,
since this matching is directly dominated by all other matchings (because all agents
prefer to be matched over being unmatched). There are three possible matchings:
i = ffig; fj; kgg, j = ffjg; fi; kgg and i = ffkg; fi; jgg. Assume, without loss
of generality, that 2 = k and 1 = j. The same reasoning could be applied
for any other pair of matchings satisfying 1  2. Since 1  2 it must be [by
Proposition 1] that i is better o¤ in 1 (since j is worse o¤ being unmatched). Note
that k is also better o¤ in 1 since she is unmatched in 2. But then i and k can
enforce 1 over 2 and they are both better o¤, contradicting that 1  2.
Proof of Proposition 5. ()) The existence of a ring S in the preferences with
jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si si 1 si j, for any j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g, is a su¢ cient
condition for non-existence of stable matchings in any stable matching (absolutely
stable or not). We prove it as follows:
Let  be a matching such that (si) = j for some si 2 S and some j =2 S. This
matching is blocked by the pair fsi; si 1g. Therefore any matching containing a pair
formed by an agent in the ring and an agent outside the ring is not stable. Consider
then a matching 0 satisfying that 0(si) = si+1 and 0(si 1) = si 1 (given that
jSj = 3, maximizing the number of agents in the ring matched among themselves,
there is always one agent in the ring who is alone at 0). This matching is blocked
by the pair fsi 1; si+1g. Therefore any matching in which agents in S are matched
among themselves is not stable. Hence, there is no matching stable as we wanted to
prove.10
(() Now, we will show that if a roommate problem is absolutely stable and
10Notice that this result holds for any roommate problem not only for absolutely stable roommate
problems.
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unsolvable then there exists a ring S in P satisfying that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S,
si+1 si si 1 si j for any j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
Let (N;P ) be unsolvable and absolutely stable. Since (N;P ) is unsolvable there
exists a ring S = fs1; :::; skg  N where k is odd (an odd ring). See Appendix A.
 We rst show that it must be that jSj = 3. Suppose not, then consider
fs1; :::; s4g  S. Let 2 be a matching such that 2(s2) = s3 and 2(s) = s for
every s =2 fs2; s3g, and let 1 be a matching such that 1(s1) = s2, 1(s3) = s4,
and 1(s) = s for every s =2 fs1; :::; s4g. Then 1  2. However, 1  2
since 2(s2) s2 1(s2). This contradicts absolute stability of (N;P ).
 We now show that for any si 2 S there cannot exist an agent j =2 S such that
j 2 M si . Suppose rst that j 2 M si and si+1 si j. Let 2 be a matching
such that 2(si) = si+1 and 2(s) = s for every s =2 fsi; si+1g, and let 1 be
a matching such that 1(si+1) = si 1, 1(si) = j, and 1(s) = s for every
s =2 S [ fjg. Then 1  2. However, 1  2 since 2(si) si 1(si). This
contradicts absolute stability of (N;P ). Suppose instead that j 2 M si and
j si si+1. Let 2 be a matching such that 2(si) = si 1 and 2(s) = s for every
s =2 fsi; si 1g, and let 1 be a matching such that 1(si) = j, 1(si 1) = si+1,
and 1(s) = s for every s =2 S [ fjg. Then 1  2. However, 1  2 since
2(si 1) si 1 1(si 1). This contradicts absolute stability of (N;P ).
 We nally show that for any si 2 S there cannot exist an agent j =2 S such that
j si si 1. Suppose not, then from the argument developed in the paragraph
above we must have that j 2 Asi . Then let 2 be a matching such that
2(si) = j and 2(s) = s for every s =2 fsi; jg, and let 1 be a matching such
that 1(si) = si 1 and 1(s) = s for every s =2 fsi; si 1g. Then 1  2. Note
in particular that, since j 2 Asi , agent j is better o¤ in 1. However, 1  2
since 2(si) si 1(si). This contradicts absolute stability of (N;P ).
But then we have found a ring S in P such that jSj = 3 and 8si 2 S, si+1 si
si 1 si j for any j 2 N n fsi+1; si 1g.
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove (i) consider an absolutely stable roommate
problem, (N;P ), with more than one matching. By Lemma 1, we know that the
matchings in the core dominate each other indirectly. However, by Proposition 2,
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they do not dominate each other directly, contradicting that the problem is ab-
solutely stable. Hence the core must be unique.
To prove (ii) suppose then that there is an agent i who is not matched in the
core to her most preferred partner. Let j = C(i) such that t(i) i j. Since j 6= t(i),
there exists an agent k such that k i j. Let 2 be a matching such that 2(i) = k
and the rest of the individuals are unmatched. By Lemma 1, C  2. Assume that
i k k, then C  2 since k i j and the pair fi; jg does not block 2 and enforce
C . Therefore, k k i. Then fkg blocks 2 enforcing a new matching in which
agent i is unmatched. So if C > 2, then i = j proving that either C(i) = t(i) or
C(i) = i.
References
Alcalde J (1995) Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided
matching markets. Economic Design 1:275-287.
Banerjee S, Konishi H, Sönmez T (2001) Core in a simple coalition formation game.
Social Choice and Welfare 18:135-153.
Barberá S, Berga D, Moreno B (2010) Individual versus group strategy-proofness:
When do they coincide. Journal of Economic Theory 145:1648-1674.
Chwe MS (1994) Farsighted coalitional stability. Journal of Economic Theory 63,
299325.
Chung KS (2000) On the existence of stable roommate matchings. Games and
Economic Behavior 33:206-230.
Diamantoudi E, Xue L (2003) Farsighted stability in hedonic games. Social Choice
and Welfare 21:39-61.
Diamantoudi E, Miyagawa E, Xue L (2004) Random paths to stability in the
roommate problem. Games and Economic Behavior 48:18-28.
Ehlers L (2007) Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 134:537-547.
18
Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer-
ican Mathematical Monthly 69:9-15.
Harsanyi JC (1974) An equilibrium-point interpretation of stable sets and a pro-
posed alternative denition. Management Science 20:1472-1495.
Inarra E, Larrea C, Molis E (2010) Stability of the roommate problem revisited.
Core Discussion Paper 2010/7.
Klaus B, Klijn F, Walzl M (2011) Farsighted stability for roommate markets. Forth-
coming in Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V, Vergote W (2011) von Neumann Morgernstern far-
sightedly stable sets in two-sided matching. Forthcoming in Theoretical Eco-
nomics.
Roth AE, Sotomayor M (1990) Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic
modeling and analysis. Econometric Society Monograph 18, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
Tan JJM (1991) A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a complete
stable matching. Journal of Algorithms 12:154-178.
Weber RJ (1976) Absolutely stable games. Proceedings of the American Mathe-
matical Society, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 116-118.
19
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2010/74. Cédric CEULEMANS, Victor GINSBURGH and Patrick LEGROS. Rock and roll bands, 
(in)complete contracts and creativity. 
2010/75. Nicolas GILLIS and François GLINEUR. Low-rank matrix approximation with weights or 
missing data is NP-hard. 
2010/76. Ana MAULEON, Vincent VANNETELBOSCH and Cecilia VERGARI. Unions' relative 
concerns and strikes in wage bargaining. 
2010/77. Ana MAULEON, Vincent VANNETELBOSCH and Cecilia VERGARI. Bargaining and delay 
in patent licensing. 
2010/78. Jean J. GABSZEWICZ and Ornella TAROLA. Product innovation and market acquisition of 
firms. 
2010/79. Michel LE BRETON, Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO, Alexei SAVVATEEV and Shlomo 
WEBER. Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership. 
2010/80. Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO. Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods. 
2010/81. Jean HINDRIKS, Marijn VERSCHELDE, Glenn RAYP and Koen SCHOORS. School 
tracking, social segregation and educational opportunity: evidence from Belgium. 
2010/82. Jean HINDRIKS, Marijn VERSCHELDE, Glenn RAYP and Koen SCHOORS. School 
autonomy and educational performance: within-country evidence. 
2010/83. Dunia LOPEZ-PINTADO. Influence networks. 
2010/84. Per AGRELL and Axel GAUTIER. A theory of soft capture. 
2010/85. Per AGRELL and Roman KASPERZEC. Dynamic joint investments in supply chains under 
information asymmetry. 
2010/86. Thierry BRECHET and Pierre M. PICARD. The economics of airport noise: how to manage 
markets for noise licenses. 
2010/87. Eve RAMAEKERS. Fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents. 
2011/1. Yu. NESTEROV. Random gradient-free minimization of convex functions. 
2011/2. Olivier DEVOLDER, François GLINEUR and Yu. NESTEROV. First-order methods of 
smooth convex optimization with inexact oracle. 
2011/3. Luc BAUWENS, Gary KOOP, Dimitris KOROBILIS and Jeroen V.K. ROMBOUTS. A 
comparison of forecasting procedures for macroeconomic series: the contribution of structural 
break models. 
2011/4. Taoufik BOUEZMARNI and Sébastien VAN BELLEGEM. Nonparametric Beta kernel 
estimator for long memory time series. 
2011/5. Filippo L. CALCIANO. The complementarity foundations of industrial organization. 
2011/6. Vincent BODART, Bertrand CANDELON and Jean-François CARPANTIER. Real exchanges 
rates in commodity producing countries: a reappraisal. 
2011/7. Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, Marco MANTOVANI, Ana MAULEON and Vincent 
VANNETELBOSCH. Myopic or farsighted? An experiment on network formation. 
2011/8. Florian MAYNERIS and Sandra PONCET. Export performance of Chinese domestic firms: the 
role of foreign export spillovers. 
2011/9. Hiroshi UNO. Nested potentials and robust equilibria. 
2011/10. Evgeny ZHELOBODKO, Sergey KOKOVIN, Mathieu PARENTI and Jacques-François 
THISSE. Monopolistic competition in general equilibrium: beyond the CES. 
2011/11. Luc BAUWENS, Christian HAFNER and Diane PIERRET. Multivariate volatility modeling of 
electricity futures. 
2011/12. Jacques-François THISSE. Geographical economics: a historical perspective. 
2011/13. Luc BAUWENS, Arnaud DUFAYS and Jeroen V.K. ROMBOUTS. Marginal likelihood for 
Markov-switching and change-point GARCH models. 
2011/14. Gilles GRANDJEAN. Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability. 
2011/15. Pedro CANTOS-SANCHEZ, Rafael MONER-COLONQUES, José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS 
and Oscar ALVAREZ-SANJAIME. Vertical integration and exclusivities in maritime freight 
transport. 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2011/16. Géraldine STRACK, Bernard FORTZ, Fouad RIANE and Mathieu VAN VYVE. Comparison 
of heuristic procedures for an integrated model for production and distribution planning in an 
environment of shared resources. 
2011/17. Juan A. MAÑEZ, Rafael MONER-COLONQUES, José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS and 
Amparo URBANO Price differentials among brands in retail distribution: product quality and 
service quality. 
2011/18. Pierre M. PICARD and Bruno VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE. Patent office 
governance and patent system quality. 
2011/19. Emmanuelle AURIOL and Pierre M. PICARD. A theory of BOT concession contracts. 
2011/20. Fred SCHROYEN. Attitudes towards income risk in the presence of quantity constraints. 
2011/21. Dimitris KOROBILIS. Hierarchical shrinkage priors for dynamic regressions with many 
predictors. 
2011/22. Dimitris KOROBILIS. VAR forecasting using Bayesian variable selection. 
2011/23. Marc FLEURBAEY and Stéphane ZUBER. Inequality aversion and separability in social risk 
evaluation. 
2011/24. Helmuth CREMER and Pierre PESTIEAU. Social long term care insurance and redistribution. 
2011/25. Natali HRITONENKO and Yuri YATSENKO. Sustainable growth and modernization under 
environmental hazard and adaptation. 
2011/26. Marc FLEURBAEY and Erik SCHOKKAERT. Equity in health and health care. 
2011/27. David DE LA CROIX and Axel GOSSERIES. The natalist bias of pollution control. 
2011/28. Olivier DURAND-LASSERVE, Axel PIERRU and Yves SMEERS. Effects of the uncertainty 
about global economic recovery on energy transition and CO2 price. 
2011/29. Ana MAULEON, Elena MOLIS and Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH. Absolutely stable 
roommate problems. 
 
Books 
 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P. COMBES, Th. MAYER and J-F. THISSE (eds.) (2008), Economic geography: the integration of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
J-M. HURIOT and J-F. THISSE (eds) (2009), Economics of cities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
P. BELLEFLAMME and M. PEITZ (eds) (2010), Industrial organization: markets and strategies. Cambridge 
University Press. 
M. JUNGER, Th. LIEBLING, D. NADDEF, G. NEMHAUSER, W. PULLEYBLANK, G. REINELT, G. 
RINALDI and L. WOLSEY (eds) (2010), 50 years of integer programming, 1958-2008: from 
the early years to the state-of-the-art. Berlin Springer. 
G. DURANTON, Ph. MARTIN, Th. MAYER and F. MAYNERIS (eds) (2010), The economics of clusters – 
Lessons from the French experience. Oxford University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS and I. VAN DE CLOOT (eds) (2011), Notre pension en heritage. Itinera Institute. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
D. BIENSTOCK (2001), Potential function methods for approximately solving linear programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 
